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Abstract in English 
Using data for more than 200 banks from 21 OECD countries for the period 2002 to 2008, we 
examine the impact of bank regulation and supervision on banking risk. Supervisory control, 
and regulations on capital and market entry have a significant impact on 'capital and asset risk', 
while supervisory control and regulations on activities restrictions, private monitoring, market 
entry, and liquidity, have a significant effect on 'liquidity and market risk'. However, quantile 
regressions suggest that the effect of regulation and supervision differs across banks: most 
indicators of bank regulation and supervision do not have a significant effect on low-risk banks, 
while they do affect high-risk banks.  
 
Key words: Financial soundness, bank regulation and supervision, banking risk, quantile 
regression:  
 
JEL code: E44, G2 
 
Abstract in Dutch 
Gebruik makend van data voor meer dan 200 banken uit 21 OECD landen voor de periode 2002 
tot 2008 onderzoeken we het effect van bankregulering en supervisie op bankrisico. Supervisie 
en regulering van kapitaal en van toegang tot markten hebben een significant effect op 
‘kapitaal- en asset risico’, terwijl supervisie en regulering van activititeitsrestricties, private 
monitoring, markttoegang en liquiditeit een significant effect hebben op ‘liquiditeits- en 
marktrisico’. Quantile regressies suggereren dat het effect van regulering en supervisie verschilt 
per bank: de meeste indicatoren van bankregulering en supervisie hebben geen significant effect 
op banken met een laag risico, terwijl ze wel effect hebben op banken met een hoog risico. 
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Abstract 
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2008, we examine the impact of bank regulation and supervision on banking risk. Su-
pervisory control, and regulations on capital and market entry have a significant impact 
on 'capital and asset risk', while supervisory control and regulations on activities restric-
tions, private monitoring, market entry, and liquidity, have a significant effect on 'li-
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The world wide financial crisis following the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 
2008 has highlighted the importance of adequate banking regulation and supervision. 
The G20 recently approved a package of proposals of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision to strengthen global capital and liquidity regulations in order to promote a 
more resilient banking sector.
1  
  In view of its importance, it is quite remarkable that only a limited number of 
studies have examined the impact of bank regulation and supervision on bank fragility.
2 
This probably reflects the difficulty to measure bank regulation and supervision. Essen-
tially two sources of information have been used to construct proxies for bank regula-
tion and supervision.  
  Some studies use an index measuring the extent to which countries adhere to the 
Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision as issued by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCPs). A good example is the study by Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 
(2008) who find a positive relationship between financial soundness and the overall 
index of BCP compliance, but this result is sensitive to controlling for the institutional 
quality of the country and to the exclusion of outliers.
3 More recently, Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache (2010) have explored whether BCP compliance affects bank soundness 
as proxied by the Z-score, defined as the number of standard deviations by which bank 
returns have to fall to exhaust bank equity. Using data for 3,000 banks from 86 coun-
tries, they do not find support for the hypothesis that better compliance with BCPs re-
sults in sounder banks.  
  Compliance with the BCPs is mostly classified information. Furthermore, the 
BCP compliance indicator may be weakly associated with bank soundness, because it 
                                                 
1 See http://www.bis.org/press/p091217.htm. 
2 Earlier theoretical work includes Blum (1999) and Calem and Rob (1999).  
3 Also some older papers have used information on BCP compliance to study bank performance. Using a 
sample of 25 countries, Sundararajan et al. (2001) report that BCP compliance is not a significant deter-
minant of bank soundness. Podpiera (2006) extends the sample to 65 countries covering the period 1998–
2002 and finds that better BCP compliance lowers non-performing loans. Das et al. (2005) relate bank 
soundness to a broader concept of regulatory governance, which encompasses both compliance with the 
BCPs and with standards and codes for monetary and financial policies. They report that better regulatory 
governance is associated with sounder banks, particularly in countries with better institutions.  3 
 
proxies  for  the  overall  quality  of  the  institutional  and  macroeconomic  environment 
(Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008).  
  Alternatively, a few studies - including the present one - employ the World Bank 
survey on supervision to construct measures of bank regulation and supervision. In sev-
eral surveys, Barth et al. (2004; 2008) collected detailed and comprehensive information 
on  bank  regulation  and  supervision  for  more  than  107  countries  between  1999  and 
2008. Barth et al. (2004) analyze the effect of different dimensions of bank regulation 
and supervision on bank stability using an earlier version of the survey dataset. Their 
findings suggest that policies that induce accurate information disclosure and (incen-
tives for) private sector corporate control of banks work best to promote banking sector 
stability. Also Pasiouaris et al. (2006) use this survey to construct indicators of bank 
regulation  and  supervision.  Employing  bank  level  data  from  71  countries  and  857 
banks, they find that various dimensions of bank regulation and supervision have a sig-
nificant impact on bank ratings. 
  Various  studies  on  the  impact  of  bank  regulation  and  supervision  on  bank 
soundness use country-level data (cf. Barth et al., 2004 and Beck et al., 2006).
4 In con-
trast, we focus on the riskiness of individual banks. Our study is certainly not the first 
examining the impact of bank regulation and supervision using bank-level data (see, for 
instance, González, 2005; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008; Fonseca and González, 2010). 
However, while most of these studies focus on one indicator of risk, we apply factor 
analysis to 25 indicators of banking risk to come up with our preferred measures of risk. 
Furthermore, most previous studies use panel models in which it is assumed that the 
effect of regulation and supervision on banking risk is homogenous. But in view of the 
heterogeneity of the banks and countries included, this assumption may be questioned 
(Pesaran et al., 1996; Pesaran et al., 2005). Indeed, Delis et al. (2009) report that the 
effect of capital regulation on risk taking by banks is heterogeneous across countries, 
while Beatty and Gron (2001) find that capital regulation has a significant effect on 
                                                 
4 Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2010) also calculate aggregate Z-scores at the country level to try to 
capture the stability of the system as a whole rather than that of individual banks, but also this measure of 
soundness is not significantly related to overall BCP compliance. 4 
 
low-capital banks but not on other banks.
5 Likewise, Hanson et al. (2008) show that 
neglecting heterogeneity in banking risk may lead to inconsistent estimation results. We 
therefore use a multilevel quantile regression model to estimate the relationship between 
bank regulation and supervision and banking risk. This approach, proposed by Koenker 
and Bassett (1978), allows us to derive different parameter estimates for various condi-
tional quantiles of the risk distribution.  
We apply a three-stage approach to examine how different dimensions of bank 
regulation and supervision affect banking risk. In the first stage, we apply dynamic fac-
tor analysis to 25 indicators of banking risk and examine whether risk is multidimen-
sional. For this purpose, we use Bankscope data for more than 200 banks in 21 OECD 
countries for the period 2002 to 2008. It turns out that two factors capture most of the 
variance of the various indicators of banking risk, which we label 'capital and asset risk' 
and 'liquidity and market risk'.   
In the second stage, we use the data of Barth et al. (2004; 2008) to compute our 
proxies for bank regulation and supervision. Following Pasiouaris et al. (2006), we con-
struct seven measures: 1) capital regulations; 2) regulations on private monitoring; 3) 
regulations on activities restrictions; 4) supervisory control; 5) deposit insurer’s power; 
6) liquidity regulations, and 7) market entry regulations, respectively.  
Finally, we examine to what extent the impact of bank regulation and supervi-
sion differs across the risk distribution of banks using quantile regressions. In order to 
estimate the impact of regulation and supervision on our measures of banking risk, we 
take a long list of potential control variables into account as suggested by previous stud-
ies. Using the general-to-specific approach we decide on the specification of our model. 
We find that, on average, supervisory control, capital regulations, and market entry reg-
ulations affect 'capital and asset risk', while, on average, supervisory control, and regu-
lations on activities restrictions, private monitoring, market entry, and liquidity affect 
'liquidity and market risk'. Most importantly, however, our results also suggest that our 
measures of bank regulation and supervision do not have a uniform impact on banking 
                                                 
5 A serious drawback of the studies of Delis et al. (2009) and Beatty and Gron (2001) is that the indicator 
of risk is chosen in a rather arbitrary way. 5 
 
risk. While our measures of bank regulation and supervision do not have much effect on 
low-risk banks, they have a highly significant effect on high-risk banks. 
  The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes 
the data and methodology used. Section 3 presents the results for the effect of bank reg-
ulation and supervision on banking risk, while section 4 contains the sensitivity analy-
sis. The final section discusses our results and concludes. 
 
2. Data and methodology 
2.1 Factor analysis: banking risk 
Studies that examine bank behaviour usually employ a one-dimensional risk indicator, 
like the share of non-performing loans, return on equity, the Z-factor, capital ratios, or 
credit ratings. However, it is questionable whether these indicators fully capture bank-
ing risk. For instance, Bou-Said and Saucier (2003) argue that risk indicators based on 
balance sheet data systematically underestimate risk. According to Gaganis et al. (2006) 
and Agoraki et al. (2010), indicators on asset quality, capitalization and market structure 
are more informative as an indicator of banking risk compared to indicators of profit-
ability, efficiency and management qualities. This suggests that banking risk is multi-
dimensional. Furthermore, most indicators based on balance sheet data contain some 
measurement error due to, for example, different calculation methods or on- and off 
balance issues (Zhao et al., 2009).  
    We use proxies for the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s core set of Finan-
cial Soundness Indicators or CAMEL indicators—i.e., capital adequacy, asset quality, 
earnings and profitability, and liquidity (IMF, 2000). There is broad agreement in the 
empirical literature that the CAMEL indicators are useful in grading banks in terms of 
their financial vulnerability. Supervisors often use (combinations of) these indicators to 
come up with an assessment of a bank’s soundness. However, there is no clear agree-
ment in the literature on how exactly to combine the various CAMEL indicators. We 
therefore  apply  Dynamic  Factor  Analysis  (DFA)  to  25  CAMEL  indicators  for  219 6 
 
banks in 21 OECD countries for the period 2002 to 2008.
6 Factor analysis is a statistical 
data reduction technique used to explain variability among observed random variables 
in terms of fewer unobserved random variables called factors.
7 
    The commercial banks included in our sample are chosen mainly on the basis of 
data availability: we only include banks for which we have more than 75 percent of the 
data on the risk indicators used. For a few banks in our sample, some indicators are not 
available for all years. Overall, we have less than 15 percent missing observations. In 
order not to lose valuable information, we applied the EM algorithm of Dempster et al. 
(1977) to compute the missing observations. The variables used are shown in Table 1.
8 
The data is taken from Bankscope of Bureau van Dijk and Thomson Datastream. Table 
A2 in the Appendix shows the correlation matrix of the indicators used. 
  We  divided  the  25  indicators  of  bank  risk  in  categories  following  the  IMF 
(2000). The first group consists of indicators of capital adequacy. According to the IMF 
(2000), capital adequacy ultimately determines the robustness of financial institutions to 
shocks to their balance sheets. We measure capital adequacy using the ratio between 
total equity and total assets, and the total capital ratio (cf. Poghosyan and Čihák, 2009). 
  The second group consists of risk variables related to asset quality. We proxy 
asset quality by (1) the ratio of loan loss provisions and total loans, (2) the ratio of non-
performing loans and total loans, (3) the ratio of unreserved impaired loans and equity, 
and (4) the ratio of impaired loans and equity. An increasing non-performing loans ratio 
signals a deterioration of the quality of the credit portfolio, which may affect the finan-
cial soundness of the bank. It is often helpful to supplement this information with in-
formation on non-performing loans net of provisions, and the ratio of provisions plus 
interest  suspension  on  impaired  loans  to  total  loans—particularly,  if  impaired  loans 
                                                 
6 The study by West (1985) is a first attempt to estimate banking risk using factor analysis. West con-
cludes that banking risk is multidimensional and that each dimension is highly correlated with one of the 
CAMEL categories. 
7 Cf. Lattin et al. (2003), Wansbeek and Meijer (2000) and Stock and Watson (2002). An appendix to this 
paper that is available upon request contains an extensive description of the dynamic factor analysis 
methodology. 
8 Table A1 in the appendix shows the distribution of the banks included in our sample across countries. 
The included banks are very diverse as is illustrated by the coefficient of variation of the total assets of 
the banks included. 7 
 
have not yet been classified as non-performing (Poghosyan and Čihák, 2009; Shehzad et 
al., 2010; IMF, 2000). 
The third group of variables consists of indicators referring to managerial quali-
ties. A high ratio of expenses to total revenues may indicate that financial institutions 
are  not  operating  efficiently  due  to  management  deficiencies.  We  proxy  managerial 
quality by three indicators: the ratio of total costs and total income, the ratio of overhead 
costs and total assets, and profits per employee.  
The fourth group consists of risk indicators related to the profitability of a bank. 
Declining trends in profit indicators may signal problems regarding the sustainability of 
financial institutions. On the other hand, unusually high profits may signal excessive 
risk-taking. Our first proxy is the ratio of profits and average capital, which reflects the 
average return investors get from holding bank capital. The ratio has to be interpreted 
with caution, since a high (low) ratio may indicate both high (low) profitability as well 
as low (high) capitalization. As an alternative, we use the return on assets, which is 
commonly used to assess the risk of a financial institution (Shehzad et al., 2010). Next, 
we include the Z-score, which is the number of standard deviations below the mean by 
which returns would have to fall to wipe out bank equity. Finally, we use the ratio be-
tween charge offs and total earnings as proxy for profitability. 
The fifth group of variables consists of indicators of liquidity and leverage. As 
the case of Northern Rock has shown, insufficient liquidity may threaten the survival of 
a bank, notably so in case of severe maturity mismatches. A high leverage ratio may 
also indicate riskiness. We proxy liquidity and leverage by the following ratios: liquid 
assets to total assets, total loans to deposits, fixed assets to total assets, subordinated 
debt to equity, and liquid assets to short-term funds, debt due to the central bank, and 
debt due to other commercial banks.  
Additional to the categories as distinguished by the IMF, we include a category 
related to market risk, i.e., the risk that the value of a portfolio will decrease due to price 
changes. According to the IMF (2000), banks are increasingly involved in diversified 
operations, all of which involve one or more aspects of market risk. A high share of 8 
 
investments in volatile assets may signal a high vulnerability to fluctuations in the mar-
ket value of those assets. Also some off-balance sheet items may have market risk.  
The correlation between the different indicators ranges between -0.60 and 0.89 
and we therefore consider them as imperfect measures of banking risk. One problem is 
that some indicators are of an ex ante nature (e.g., loan ratios) while others are ex post 
variables (e.g., capital and equity ratios). Whereas ex ante variables indicate a possible 
future risk, ex post variables indicate the presence of a risk. As a solution, we have es-
timated various factor models with changing lags and leads (with a maximum of two 
years) and compare the models on the basis of different information criteria and the 
likelihood ratio statistics (cf. Klomp and De Haan, 2009). The various factor models are 
highly correlated with a correlation coefficient ranging between 0.81 and 0.89.
9 The 
chosen lag lengths are shown in Table 1. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
The next step is to decide on the number of factors to represent banking risk. 
There is no ‘optimal’ criterion for deciding on the proper number of factors. According 
to  the  so-called  Kaiser  criterion,  all  factors  with  eigenvalues  below  one  should  be 
dropped. Alternatively, the Cattell scree test, which is a graphical method in which the 
eigenvalues are plotted on the vertical axis and the factors on the horizontal axis, can be 
used. This test suggests to select the number of factors that corresponds to the point 
after which the remaining factors decline in approximately a linear fashion, and to retain 
only the factors above the elbow. Finally, information criteria, such as the information 
criterion proposed by Bai and Ng (2002), can be used. 
According to both the Kaiser rule and the scree plot, banking risk can be repre-
sented as a two dimensional construct (see Figure 1). The two-factor model is highly 
significant: the p-value of the likelihood ratio test is 0.001. Also the Bai and Ng infor-
                                                 
9 The estimation results of the various models are available upon request. 9 
 
mation criterion suggests a two-factor model. We therefore decided that the two-factor 
model is appropriate to represent banking risk. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Table 1 presents the loading of the various indicators and the variance of the indicators 
explained by the two-factor model. About sixty percent of the variance is explained by 
the two factors, while about forty percent of the total variance is unique, i.e., unex-
plained.  
  We use oblimin rotation, which minimizes the correlation between columns of 
the factor loadings matrix, to interpret the factors. In the first factor, variables on capital 
adequacy and asset quality score high so we call this factor 'capital and asset risk'. In the 
second factor, variables related to market risk and liquidity risk score high so we call 
this factor 'liquidity and market risk'. The correlation between the two factors is only 
0.28, suggesting that both factors measure a different dimension of banking risk. 
The risk factors have a low degree of persistence as shown by the low correla-
tion of the median score with the maximum or minimum score of the two factors (see 
Table 1). This is confirmed by the AR coefficient of the common part, which is signifi-
cant but lower than 0.5. Figure 2 presents a comparative analysis of the two dimensions 
of banking risk. We find that both types of risk are accumulating over time. On average, 
the 'capital and asset risk' indicator is about 3.17, while the 'liquidity and market risk' 
indicator is about 2.42. However, there are large differences between banks as illus-
trated by the standard deviation of the two risk measures (2.45 for 'asset and capital risk' 
and 2.12 for 'liquidity and market risk'). 
   
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
To check the validity of our indicators, we first compare them with the average credit 
default swap premium over the period 2002 to 2008. A credit default swap is an insur-
ance contract against the default risk of bank. The premium of a credit default swap 10 
 
depends on the probability that the default risk materializes. The correlation between the 
credit default premium and 'capital and asset risk' is about 0.51 (p=0.000), while the 
correlation between the credit default premium and 'liquidity and market risk' is about 
0.36 (p=0.001).  
  As a second step, Figure 3 shows the risks of banks, which drop from our sample 
(at t = 4) due to failure. The results show that, compared to Figure 2, these banks accu-
mulated more risk. On average, the level of risk of institutions that failed is about six 
times larger than the average risk in our sample. Figure 3 also shows that 'liquidity and 
market risk' increases faster than 'capital and asset risk', suggesting that banks may first 
encounter liquidity problems which pass-through to capital and asset problems, for ex-
ample, due to fire sales. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
As a robustness check, we re-estimated the factor analysis differentiating be-
tween banks for which we have data for the full sample period and banks that disappear 
over time due to a failure, a merger or acquisition. We find that the factor loadings on 
the risk indicators are somewhat higher in the latter sample. However, the results for the 
two samples do not show large differences compared to the results presented above (re-
sults are available upon request).
10  
 
2.2 Factor analysis: bank regulation and supervision 
We use the survey data of Barth et al. (2004; 2008) to compute proxies for bank regula-
tion and supervision. The survey consists of 175 questions. Following Pasiouaris et al. 
(2006), we classified these questions into seven groups: 1) capital regulations; 2) regula-
tions on private monitoring; 3) regulations on activities restrictions; 4) supervisory con-
trol; 5) deposit insurer’s power; 6) liquidity regulations, and 7) market entry regulations. 
In constructing our regulation variables, we use principle component analysis, which 
                                                 
10 The analysis shown in section 4 has also been done with these alternative factor models. The results 
(available upon request) are in line with those reported. 11 
 
produces a factor score with mean zero and standard deviation one. An advantage of 
this  method  is  that  individual  questions  are  not  equally  weighted.
11  The  one-
dimensional factors explain between 70 and 85 percent of the total variance of the ques-
tions included (results are available upon request).  
  The first measure refers to capital regulations and takes various issues into ac-
count, like: can regulatory capital include borrowed funds, are the sources verified by 
the regulatory or supervisory authorities, are risk elements and value losses considered 
in calculating regulatory capital? Fernandez and González (2005) find that stringent 
capital requirements reduce banking risk. Similarly, Barth et al. (2004) indicate that 
more stringent capital requirements are associated with fewer non-performing loans. 
The second dimension refers to regulations on private monitoring. This variable 
measures the degree of information that is released to officials and the public, and re-
quirements concerning auditing and credit ratings. Fernandez and González (2005) and 
Barth et al. (2004) conclude that regulations that encourage and facilitate private moni-
toring of banks increase financial soundness, as they lower moral hazard created by 
information asymmetries.  
The  third  measure  captures  regulations  on  activity  restrictions.  Due  to  moral 
hazard, banks may increase risk if they are allowed a broad range of activities (Boyd et 
al. 1993). However, the empirical results of Barth et al. (2004) indicate the opposite: 
restricting bank activities is negatively associated with bank stability and increases the 
probability of a banking crisis. In contrast, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2009) find 
that banking strategies that rely prominently on generating non-interest income or at-
tracting non-deposit funding create financial instability.  
The fourth dimension represents the ability of supervisors to exercise power and 
to get involved in banking decisions. This variable is related to the supervisor's power in 
terms of prompt corrective action, declaring insolvency, and restructuring. Strong su-
pervisory control can prevent managers from engaging in excessive risk-taking behav-
                                                 
11 We also simply summed the individual zero/one answers. This method gives equal weight to each of 
the questions in constructing the regulatory variables. However, the results are very similar to those re-
ported and are available upon request. 12 
 
iour. Barth et al. (2004) do not confirm the hypothesis that there is a significant relation-
ship between banking risk and official supervisory power, but Fernandez and González 
(2005) report that in countries with low accounting and auditing requirements more 
supervisory control appears to reduce risk.  
The fifth measure covers deposit insurance and the power of the deposit insurer. 
According to Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), a deposit insurance system influ-
ences bank soundness in two opposite ways. On the one hand, bank runs are less likely 
to occur when deposits are insured. On the other hand, a deposit insurance system pro-
vides banks incentives to engage in more risk-taking. Barth et al. (2004) and Demirgüç-
Kunt  and  Detragiache  (2002)  provide  evidence  that  an  explicit  deposit  insurance 
scheme tends to increase the probability of banking crises. The adverse impact of de-
posit insurance tends to increase the more extensive the coverage of the scheme. Fur-
thermore, the negative impact is stronger for schemes funded by the government rather 
than the private sector (cf. Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane, 2002).  
The sixth regulatory dimension refers to liquidity regulations. Wagner (2008) 
finds that an increase in the homogeneity of banks’ balance sheets decreases the finan-
cial soundness due to the joint exposure to liquidity problems in other banks at the in-
terbank market caused by, for example, fire sales.  
The final regulatory dimension reflects the ease with which the domestic bank-
ing market can be entered. Competition might improve the vulnerability of the banking 
sector to adverse shocks (Besanko and Thakor, 1992; Cordella and Yeyati, 2002). In-
creased competition may also increase risk-taking behaviour of banks as it erodes the 
quasi-monopoly rents granted by the government charters and the value of the charters. 
Barth et al. (2004) indicate that barriers to foreign-bank entry are positively associated 
with bank fragility. Likewise, Beck et al. (2006) report that that banking systems where 
a large fraction of entry applications are denied and where regulations restrict banks 
from engaging in non-loan activities face a higher probability of a systemic crisis. 
  The correlation matrix in Table 2 shows that the correlation between the seven 
measures of bank regulation and supervision ranges between -0.12 and 0.37 indicating 
that the various measures capture different dimensions of the regulatory framework.  13 
 
Table 3 categorizes the countries according to the difference between the maxi-
mum and minimum factor scores. Table 3 illustrates that the regulatory dimensions are 
quite constant. In most cases more than 80 percent of the countries have a difference 
between the maximum and minimum score of less than 10 percent. Due to the limited 
fluctuations over time of our indicators of banking regulation and supervision, the prob-
ability that reverse causality (i.e. banking risk affects bank regulation and supervision) 
drives our findings seems limited. 
 
[Insert Table 2 and Table 3 here] 
 
2.3 Empirical model 
In this section, we develop our model to examine the relationship between risk-taking 
by banks and bank regulation and supervision. As we include a large number of banks 
from different countries, our sample is very well suited to test whether our measures of 
banking  regulation  and  supervision  have  a  homogeneous  impact  on  our  proxies  for 
banking risk. We use quantile regressions, as introduced by Koenker and Basset (1978), 
which is a generalization of median regression analysis to other quantiles.
12 The median 
regression fits a regression line through all observations by minimizing the sum of abso-
lute errors, i.e., it estimates the median of the conditional distribution. The τ-th quantile 
of the conditional distribution is estimated by minimizing:  
 
( ) Y X τ φ β −                   (1) 
 
with respect to β, where  ( ) ( ( 0)) u u I u τ φ τ = − < .  This function can be interpreted 
as the inclination of bank riskiness (Y), which is dependent on observed variables (X) 
and a random error term (u). The conditional quantile function can be formally ex-
pressed as: 
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Estimating a whole set of quantile functions provides a richer description of the hetero-
geneous relation between bank regulation and supervision and bank soundness. While 
standard regression estimators (like OLS) are  not robust to modest departures  from 
normality, quantile regression results are robust to outliers and distributions with heavy 
tails.
13 Furthermore, the quantile regression approach avoids the restrictive assumption 
that the error terms are identically distributed at all points of the conditional distribu-
tion. By allowing for parameter heterogeneity, the quantile regression approach is suit-
able to explore how bank risk is related to our proxies for bank regulation and supervi-
sion at different locations of the banking risk distribution.  
As the risk of banks located in the same country may not be independent from 
one another, we use a multilevel model, which is a particular regression technique that 
is designed to take into account the hierarchical structure of data (Raudenbush and 
Bryk, 1987)
14. The baseline quantile regression is given by: 
 
t j t i t jt pijt p kijt ijt jt kijt ijt RI Z BR RI BR Q , , 1 1 1 ) | ( ε ε η γ β θ α τ τ τ τ τ + + + + + + = − − −   (3) 
 
where BRkijt is the risk indicator of type k ('capital and asset risk and 'liquidity and mar-
ket risk') for bank i in country j at time t. We include the lagged dependent variable to 
control for autoregressive tendencies. Zpijt-1 is a vector of (lagged) control variables con-
taining p elements, while RI is a vector containing the measures of (lagged) bank regu-
lation and supervision outlined above. The parameter ηt captures time fixed effects. The 
                                                 
13 The Jarque-Bera test for normality suggests that normality is rejected at the usual probability levels for 
both our proxies for bank risk. The p-value for 'capital and asset risk' is 0.08 and the p-value for 'liquidity 
and market risk' is 0.04. The non-normality of the distribution can also be illustrated that more than 30 
percent of the observations are not in the non-outlier range of 2 times the standard deviation from the 
mean. 
14 Alternatively one can use time fixed effects, country fixed effects and bank fixed effects. However, this 
decreases the number of degrees of freedom drastically. 15 
 
final two terms are error terms measured on bank level i and country level j, respec-






15 We estimated the model on 'capital and asset risk' and 'liquidity and market 
risk' simultaneously using a system of two equations. 
We include control variables suggested by previous studies. First, we control for 
macroeconomic factors: inflation, economic growth, depreciation of the exchange rate, 
external debt, current account balance, and shocks to the terms of trade (see also Beck et 
al., 2006). Adverse shocks affecting the economy will increase the instability of the 
financial system, for example, by affecting the solvency of borrowers, by increasing 
uncertainty, or by unexpected and excessive exposure to foreign exchange risk.
16 We 
also include GDP per capita to control for differences in economic development. 
According to Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), high short-term real in-
terest rates affect bank balance sheets adversely if banks cannot increase their lending 
rates quickly enough and hence increase banking risk. Furthermore, Calvo et al. (1993) 
conclude that capital flows are sensitive to changes in the level of the world interest 
rate. Large capital inflows and capital flight may affect the stability of the financial sec-
tor. Frankel (1999) argues that since the 1990s international private capital inflows have 
rapidly increased, raising financial vulnerability and the transmission of financial crises. 
To test whether banking sector risk is related to sudden capital outflows or changes in 
the foreign exchange reserves, we include the interest rate differential
17
, net financial 
flows, and the ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves. 
The government surplus as a percentage of GDP affects the financial room to 
manoeuvre of a government for intervening in a banking crisis through recapitalization 
and nationalization operations. According to Laeven and Valencia (2008), in about 85 
percent of the banking crises the government had to recapitalize a bank, while in more 
than 57 percent of the crises the government even had to nationalize some banks.  
                                                 
15 We also estimated the regression for the 5
th and 10
th quantile. However, none of the measures of bank 
regulation and supervision are significant due to the small number of observations in these quantiles. 
16 Goldstein et al. (2000) find that overvaluation of the real exchange rate is the key determinant of a 
financial crises. 
17 Defined as the difference of the real interest rate of a country and the world interest rate. The world 
interest rate is defined as the average interest rate in the United States, Germany and Japan. 16 
 
Keefer (1999) and Jo (2006) argue that not only the economic situation matters 
for financial soundness but also the political environment of a country. Keefer (1999) 
finds that the determinants of financial soundness are substantially different in countries 
with many checks and balances compared to countries with fewer checks and balances. 
Countries lacking a sound legal system and good governance might have more financial 
system problems due to corruption or inefficient enforcement of law and government 
ineffectiveness (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; La Porta et al., 1998; Levine, 
1998; Barth et al., 2004; Fernandez and González, 2005). To capture this, we include a 
measure based on the first principal component of indicators of the control of corrup-
tion, bureaucratic quality, rule of law, and democratic accountability of the International 
Country Risk Guide (2006). 
Next, we include a measure to capture financial liberalization. Improperly im-
plemented financial liberalization is likely to cause banking crises as financial institu-
tions are allowed more opportunities for risk-taking in a liberalized financial market 
(Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). We proxy financial liberalization by including the first 
principal component of the indicators of credit controls, interest rate controls, capital 
account restrictions, and security market policy taken from Abiad et al. (2008).  
In addition, we add a variable to check whether globalization affects the risk tak-
ing behaviour of a bank (source: Dreher, 2006). This effect can be positive or negative, 
depending on the correlation with foreign financial shocks. If the correlation is positive, 
globalization will decrease the financial soundness, but when the correlation is negative 
globalization can have a smoothing effect on financial markets. 
Finally, we control for concentration as De Nicolo et al. (2004) find that highly 
concentrated banking systems exhibit higher levels of systemic risk. In contrast, Beck et 
al. (2006) report that banking crises are less likely in more concentrated banking sys-
tems.  
We also include bank-level control variables. First, Berle and Means (1933) ar-
gue  that  that  ownership  concentration  improves  financial  soundness.  Shezhad  et  al. 
(2010) and Laeven and Levine (2009) find that ownership concentration significantly 
affects loan quality and bank capitalization. We include a dummy variable taking the 17 
 
value one if a bank has a shareholder who owns more than 25 percent of the bank con-
cerned. We also include a dummy reflecting whether the government owns more than 
50 percent of the stocks of a bank. Caprio and Martinez Peria (2001) and La Porta et al. 
(2002) find that government ownership is significantly associated with increases in bank 
fragility. We also include a dummy reflecting whether a bank is foreign owned. We 
include the natural logarithm of real total assets to control for the size of a bank. Finally, 
we include the number of subsidiaries as a proxy for diversification and business fran-
chise power. 
Table A3 in the appendix provides an overview of all variables, their definition 
as well as their source, while Table A4 presents a correlation matrix. All economic ex-
planatory variables are lagged to avoid simultaneity and endogenity problems. The lag 
structure is determined by the Akaike Information Criterion. We also include the lagged 
'capital and asset risk' measure as an explanatory variable in the 'liquidity and market 
risk' regression and vice versa.  
Before we proceed, we have to deal with the potential endogeneity of bank regu-
lation and supervision. Barth et al. (2004) argue that bank regulation and supervision is 
affected by the general policy stance of the government and reflects national differences 
in  legal  and  political  systems  (see  also  Demirgüç-Kunt  and  Detragiache,  2010).  To 
check for potential endogeneity of bank regulation and supervision, we use a 2SLS in-
strumental regression model. We include a number of instrumental variables. First, we 
use the economic freedom index of the Fraser Institute and the ratio of total government 
spending to GDP, which both measure the involvement of the government in the eco-
nomic process.
18 Second, we include a political ideology indicator, which measures the 
policy preferences of the government on a scale from -1 (full leftwing) to  +1 (full 
rightwing); source: Beck et al. (2001). Third, we take up a measure of central bank in-
dependence, which measures differences in the independence of monetary policy mak-
ers across countries, following the method of Klomp and De Haan (2010) and using the 
data of Arnone et al. (2007) and Acemoglu et al. (2008). These variables do not directly 
                                                 
18 See http://www.freetheworld.com. 18 
 
impact risk-taking by banks. This is also reflected in the correlation between these vari-
ables and our measures of banking risking, which is about zero. We estimate the quan-
tile regressions using the methodology proposed by Chernozhukov and Hansen (2006, 
2008) and Galvao (2009) by including also the lagged regressors as instruments to re-
duce the bias associated with dynamic quantile regressions. 
 We check the validity of our instruments by the Amemiya-Lee-Newey mini-
mum chi-square test under the null hypothesis that the used group of instruments is val-
id, i.e., they are uncorrelated with the error term in the equation. We cannot reject the 
null hypothesis, indicating that our set of instruments is valid. Next, we apply the Wald 
test of exogeneity under the null hypothesis that the instrumented variables are exoge-
nous. The results suggest that our bank regulation and supervision measures are not 
endogenous.  
 
3. Empirical results 
This section presents the estimation results on the effect of bank regulation and supervi-
sion on our proxies for banking risk using quantile regressions.  
  We formulate our baseline model using the general-to-specific approach. That is, 
we estimate a model including all control variables as outlined in the previous section, 
but without including our proxies for bank regulation and supervision. Next, we drop 
the least significant variable and estimate the model again. We repeat this procedure 
until only variables that are significant at a 10 percent level remain in at least one quan-
tile (see Hendry, 1993). In view of the unequal distribution of the number of banks 
within a country, we cluster the Huber-White standard errors to obtain consistent stan-
dard errors.
19 Because our measures for bank regulation and supervision are estimated, 
we use bootstrapping to obtain consistent standard errors. 
About 40 percent of the total variance in banking risk can be attributed to the 
variance at the country level. This implies that there is risk dependence within a country 
and that it is appropriate to use a multilevel model. Table 4 reports the estimated mar-
                                                 
19 For example, our sample contains 41 banks from the United States, while it only contains 2 banks from 
Denmark and Portugal. 19 
 
ginal effects evaluated at the mean, which can be interpreted as elasticities, of the de-
terminants of banking risk. Our results suggest that, on average, economic growth re-
duces banking risk, while financial liberalization increases banking risk. In contrast, 
inflation and size are not significant in the mean regressions. Next, a current account 
deficit increases 'liquidity and market risk', while currency deprecation decreases and 
dispersed ownership increases 'capital and asset risk'. Finally, we find that better institu-
tional quality decreases both types of risk over the entire conditional risk distribution. 
This confirms the results of Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) and Fernandez and 
González (2005) that corruption and bureaucracy increase the risk-taking behaviour of 
banks. 
Table 4 also shows that the marginal effect of the control variables differs sig-
nificantly across quantiles. For instance, the results indicate that dispersed ownership 
increases the risk-taking behaviour of banks with the highest risk. One explanation for 
this result is that it is caused by the free-riding behaviour of small shareholders. No sin-
gle shareholder has the incentive to monitor bank management, because his personal 
cost will exceed the benefits. Likewise, the relative size of a bank significantly increases 
the riskiness of high-risk banks. Furthermore, financial liberalization has a positive ef-
fect on banking risk for banks in the right tail of the risk distribution. Finally, we find 
that for the more riskier quantiles, 'liquidity and market risk' has an effect on 'capital and 
asset risk' and vice versa. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Next, we include our proxies for bank regulation and supervision in our baseline model. 
In Table 5 we report the total effect of these measures. That is, we report the sum of the 
direct effect of a measure and its indirect effect through the effect on the other type of 
risk. The share of the indirect effect to the total effect ranges between zero and 20 per-
cent.
20 This implies that regulation and supervision have the largest impact on banking 
                                                 
20 The division between direct and indirect effect is available upon request. 20 
 
risk through their direct effect. The extent to which banking regulation and supervision 
has a heterogeneous impact can be illustrated by the standard deviation of the coeffi-
cients which are reported in columns (6) and (12).  
  We first add our measure for capital regulation. The results show that, on aver-
age, this type of regulation significantly decreases 'capital and asset' risk. If the level of 
capital regulation increases by one percent, 'capital and asset' risk decreases by 0.4 per-
cent. However, the results also show that the impact is not uniform across quantiles. 
This confirms the results of Beatty and Gron (2001) and Delis et al. (2009). Capital reg-
ulations are most effective for banks with high levels of 'capital and asset' risk. 
Next, we include our proxy for regulations on private monitoring. The results 
indicate that these regulations decrease 'liquidity and market' risk, notably so for high-
risk banks. This confirms the results of Barth et al. (2004). Regulations on private moni-
toring do not affect 'capital and asset risk'.  
Regulations on  activities restrictions on  average reduce  'liquidity and  market 
risk', but again the effect is only significant for high-risk banks. This dimension of bank 
regulation and supervision also affects 'capital and asset' risk of high-risk banks. 
In contrast to other dimensions of bank regulation and supervision, supervisory 
control significantly affects both types of risk for all banks. However, the effect is larger 
for riskier banks.  
  We do not find any effect of regulations on deposit insurance on the level of 
banking risk. Apparently, the opposing effects of a deposit insurance scheme on bank-
ing risk cancel out.  
The impact of liquidity regulations is also heterogeneous: although significant in 
the mean regression, they especially decrease ‘liquidity and market’ risk of high-risk 
banks.  
Finally, market entry regulations reduce both types of risk, but again the effects 
are strongest for high-risk banks. 
   
[Insert Table 5 here] 
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To sum up, we find that, on average, supervisory control, and regulations on capital and 
market entry have a significant impact on 'capital and asset risk', while supervisory con-
trol and regulations on activities restrictions, private monitoring, market entry, and li-
quidity, have a significant effect on 'liquidity and market risk'. However, quantile re-
gressions suggest that the effect of regulation and supervision differs across banks: most 
indicators of bank regulation and supervision do not have a significant effect on low-
risk banks, while they do affect high-risk banks.  
 
4. Sensitivity analysis 
It is possible that the effect of bank regulation and supervision differs across various 
types of banks. For instance, Laeven and Levine (2009) argue that the same regulations 
may have different effects on bank risk-taking behaviour depending on the ownership 
structure of a bank. As a robustness check, we therefore split our sample as follows: 
listed vs. non-listed banks, and banks with public vs. banks with private ownership. An-
other possibility is that regulation has a different effect on banks that differ in terms of 
their size. Therefore, we also split our sample into small and large banks.
21  
The first two columns of Table 6 show the results for listed vs. non-listed banks. 
We find that the effects of regulations on liquidity and activity restrictions are higher for 
listed banks, while the effect of regulations on private monitoring is significantly higher 
for non-listed banks.  
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 we divide the sample into banks where the 
government owes more than fifty percent of the shares and banks that are privately held. 
The results indicate that restrictions on liquidity and activity have a stronger effect on 
risks of private banks.  
  In the final two columns of Table 6, we divide the total sample in banks with a 
total asset value of more 300 billion US dollar and banks with a total asset value below 
                                                 
21 The results for the quantiles of the various sample splits show a similar pattern as in Table 5. This im-
plies that most regulatory proxies have the largest impact on high-risk banks (results are available upon 
request). 22 
 
300 billion US dollar.
22 The results in Table 6 indicate that regulations on activity re-
strictions have the largest impact on large banks, while capital regulations have the 
largest effect on small banks.  
In conclusion: our sensitivity results indicate that the effect of bank regulation 
and supervision on banking risk is not conditional only on the riskiness of a bank, but 
also on the ownership structure and the size of the bank. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
5. Conclusions  
The world wide financial crisis has led to renewed attempts to enhance bank regulation 
and supervision. Previous research has come up with mixed results concerning the ef-
fectiveness of bank regulation and supervision in reducing banking risk. There are three 
major issues that have to be dealt with in examining the relationship between bank regu-
lation and supervision and banking risk. First, there is no generally accepted definition 
of banking risk. As a solution, we apply factor analysis on 25 indicators of banking risk 
and examine whether risk is multidimensional. Using information for more than 200 
banks in 21 OECD countries for the period 2002 to 2008, we conclude that two factors 
capture most of the variance of the various indicators of bank risk, which we label 'capi-
tal and asset risk' and 'liquidity and market risk'. Second, bank regulation and supervi-
sion is a multi-faceted concept as well. We have constructed seven measures of bank 
regulation and supervision, applying principal component analysis to the data of Barth 
et al., 2004; 2008). Finally, it is not clear whether the relationship between bank regula-
tion and supervision and bank risk is homogeneous across banks. To deal with this is-
sue, we have used quantile regressions; the quantiles are determined on the basis of the 
riskiness of the banks. 
  We find that supervisory control, capital regulations, and market entry regula-
tions have a significant effect on 'capital and asset risk', while supervisory control and 
                                                 
22 This is the average size of the banks in our sample over the entire sample period. 23 
 
regulations on activity restrictions, private monitoring, market entry restrictions, and 
liquidity have a significant effect on 'liquidity and market risk'. Our most important 
finding, however, is that the impact of bank regulation and supervision on banking risk 
is not uniform. Our results suggest that regulation and supervision do not have much 
effect on low-risk banks, while most of our measures for the various dimensions of bank 
regulation and supervision do have a highly significant effect on high-risk banks. In 
addition, our sensitivity analysis suggests that the effect of bank regulation and supervi-
sion also depends on the ownership structure and the size of a bank.  
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Table 1. Dynamic factor analysis banking risk 
  Lags  Factor 1  Factor 2  Variance explained 
      Capital and asset risk  Liquidity and market risk    
         
Capital adequacy  1  -0.627  -0.013  0.39 
Total equity / total assets  1  -0.890  -0.140  0.81 
Total capital ratio         
         
Asset quality  -1  -0.685  -0.021  0.47 
Loan loss provision / total loans  -1  0.853  0.006  0.73 
Non performing loans / total loans  -1  0.512  0.159  0.29 
Unreserved impaired loans/ equity  0  -0.880  -0.292  0.86 
Impaired loans/ equity  0  0.733  0.162  0.56 
         
Managerial qualities         
Total cost / total income  -1  -0.259  -0.278  0.14 
Overhead cost/total assets  -1  0.078  0.270  0.08 
Profit / number of employees  0  0.145  0.231  0.12 
         
Earnings and profitability         
Return on equity  0  -0.871  -0.300  0.85 
Return on assets  0  -0.658  -0.323  0.54 
Charge offs / total equity  1  0.734  0.230  0.59 
Log (Bank Z-Score)  0  -0.753  0.002  0.57 
         
Liquidity         
Liquid assets / total assets  0  -0.178  -0.853  0.76 
Total loans / deposits  0  0.165  0.782  0.64 
Fixed assets / total assets  0  0.020  0.769  0.59 
Subordinated debt / equity  0  0.245  0.860  0.80 
Liquid assets/ customers and short-term funds  0  -0.233  -0.883  0.83 
Due to central bank / total equity  1  0.112  0.474  0.35 
Due to commercial banks / total equity  1  0.098  0.273  0.14 
         
Market risk management         
Total interest expenses / total deposits  0  0.284  0.199  0.12 
Off balance items / total assets  0  0.033  0.676  0.46 
Government deposit / total deposit  0  -0.199  -0.618  0.42 
Government securities / total assets  0  -0.302  -0.599  0.45 
Stock return variability  -1  0.552  0.542  0.73 
         
Correlation with the maximum     0.414  0.428   
Correlation with the minimum    0.427  0.374   
AR coefficient of the common part λ    0.438  0.397   
h-squared  0.583       
Likelihood ratio test p-value  0.001       
Bai and Ng test p-value  0.000       
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test  0.580          
 
* For some banks the stock return is not available. We used the credit default premium variability for these banks, which is highly 
correlated with stock return variability. All data come from Bankscope, except stock return variability, which is taken from Data-
stream. The shaded loadings are above 0.4, indicating that these indicators are relevant in capturing this type of risk. 31 
 
Table 2. Correlation matrix: bank regulation and supervision variables 
 
      (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Capital regulations  (1)  1.00  -0.12  -0.04  -0.05  -0.09  -0.12  0.01 
Regulations on private monitoring  (2    1.00 0.17 0.08 0.12 0.22  0.22 
Regulations on activity restrictions  (3)      1.00 0.23 0.08 0.37  0.12 
Supervisory control  (4)        1.00 -0.09 -0.12  0.18 
Deposit insurer’s power  (5)          1.00 -0.05  -0.04 
Liquidity regulations  (6)            1.00  0.13 





Table 3. Changes in bank regulation and supervision 



















               
 I < |10|%  86.12  87.24  83.30  79.01  77.70  80.44  81.14 
               
|10|% <  I < |15|%  11.27  10.76  11.41  12.04  10.63  11.65  11.18 
               
|15|% <  I < |20|%  2.17  1.96  2.34  6.37  2.05  2.01  4.04 
               
|20|% <  I  0.44  0.52  2.02  2.31  9.62  5.90  3.36 
The table shows the share of countries in the individual categories. The categories are based on the x% 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2. Average measures of banking risk, 2002-2008 
 36 
 












Australia  4  4.457 
Austria  3  5.127 
Belgium  3  2.472 
Canada  4  1.683 
Czech republic  1  0.000 
Denmark  3  2.676 
France  8  2.750 
Germany  17  2.353 
Greece  3  1.151 
Iceland  2  0.865 
Ireland  4  1.430 
Italy  12  4.003 
Japan  9  3.760 
Netherlands  3  2.554 
Norway  2  3.215 
Portugal  4  0.243 
Spain  9  2.522 
Sweden  5  5.223 
Switzerland  2  11.969 
United Kingdom  22  3.102 
United states  55  2.718 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A3. Variables and sources used 
Variable  Description  Source 
Current account balance  Value of export minus import as a share of GDP  World Bank (2008) 
Inflation  Change in the consumer price index  World Bank (2008) 
Economic growth  Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita at market prices based on constant 2000 
U.S. dollars 
World Bank (2008) 
Depreciation  Depreciation of the official exchange rate  World Bank (2008) 
External debt  Total external debt is debt owed to non-residents repayable in foreign currency, goods, or 
services. Total external debt is the sum of public, publicly guaranteed, and private nonguar-
anteed long-term debt, use of IMF credit, and short-term debt 
World Bank (2008) 
Term of trade shocks  Standard deviation of the value of import divided by the value of export in constant prices of 
2000. 
World Bank (2008) 
Income per capita  The total output of goods and services for final use occurring within the domestic territory of 
a given country, regardless of the allocation to domestic and foreign claims. Data are in 
constant 2000 U.S. dollars per capita. 
World Bank (2008) 
Real interest rate  The deposit interest rate less the rate of inflation measured by the GDP deflator.  World Bank (2008) 
Interest rate differential  Difference between the rate interest rate in a country and the average real interest of Ger-
many, United States and Japan. 
World Bank (2008) 
Net financial flows  Total inflow of capital minus the outflow of capital. This including disbursements of loans 
and credits less repayments of principal. 
World Bank (2008) 
M2 to foreign exchange 
reserves 
The sum of currency outside banks, demand deposits other than those of the central govern-
ment, and the time, savings, and foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than the 
central government. 
World Bank (2008) 
Government surplus  Government revenue minus government spending  World Bank (2008) 
Institutional quality  Quality of institutions measured by a PCA of bureaucratic quality, corruption, rule of law 
and government stability 
International Country Risk 
Guide (2008) 
Financial liberalization  Principle component analysis on the level of credit controls, interest rate controls, capital 
account restrictions and security market policy in a particular country and year taken from 
Abiad et al. (2008) 
Abiad et al. (2008) 
Globalization  Measure on economic integration  Dreher (2006) 
Dispersed ownership  A dummy variable taking the value if a bank has a shareholder which has an ownership 
more than 25 percent 
Bankscope (2009) 
Government ownership  A dummy variable taking the value if a bank is owned for more than 50 percent by the 
government 
Bankscope (2009) 
Subsidiaries  Number of subsidiaries  Bankscope (2009) 
Foreign activities  A dummy variable taking the value if a bank has foreign branches  Bankscope (2009) and Data-
stream (2009) 
Size  Logarithm of total assets  Bankscope (2009) 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































       